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Genetic engineering and the Moral Status of Non-Human Species
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2004-01-01 , DOI: 10.1007/s10806-004-1467-0
Anders Melin 1
Affiliation  

Genetic modification leads to several important moral issues. Up until now they have mainly been discussed from the viewpoint that only individual living beings, above all animals, are morally considerable. The standpoint that also collective entities such as species belong to the moral sphere have seldom been taken into account in a more thorough way, although it is advocated by several important environmental ethicists. The main purpose of this article is to analyze in more detail than often has been done what the practical consequences of this ethical position would be for the use of genetic engineering on animals and plants. The practical consequences of the holistic standpoint (focused on collective entities) of Holmes Rolston, III, is compared with the practical consequences of the individualistic standpoints (focused on individual living beings) of Bernard E. Rollin and Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber, respectively. The article also discusses whether the claim that species are morally considerable is tenable as a foundation for policy decisions on genetic engineering.

中文翻译:

基因工程与非人类物种的道德地位

基因改造导致了几个重要的道德问题。到目前为止,它们主要是从只有个体生物,尤其是动物,才具有道德价值的观点进行讨论的。物种等集体实体也属于道德领域的观点很少被以更彻底的方式考虑在内,尽管它被一些重要的环境伦理学家所提倡。这篇文章的主要目的是比以往更详细地分析这种伦理立场对动植物基因工程应用的实际后果。Holmes Rolston, III 的整体观点(侧重于集体实体)的实际后果,分别与 Bernard E. Rollin 和 Philipp Balzer、Klaus Peter Rippe 和 Peter Schaber 的个人主义立场(关注个体生物)的实际后果进行了比较。文章还讨论了物种在道德上具有重要意义的说法是否可以作为基因工程政策决策的基础。
更新日期:2004-01-01
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