Abstract In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance‐solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

中文翻译：

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战略选择中的眼动

摘要在风险和其他多属性选择中，选择过程可以通过随机游走或漂移扩散模型很好地描述，其中证据随着时间的推移累积到阈值。在战略选择中，已经提供了 k 级和认知层次模型作为选择过程的说明，人们在其中模拟对手或合作伙伴的选择过程。我们记录了 2 × 2 对称游戏中的眼球运动，包括像囚徒困境这样的优势可解游戏和像猎鹿和鹰鸽这样的不对称协调游戏。证据与收益差异随时间的累积最为一致：我们发现当收益差异更加精细平衡时，更长的持续时间选择具有更多的固定，一种新出现的偏向更多地关注最终选择的行动的收益，收益之间转换的简单计数——无论比较是否具有战略信息——与最终选择密切相关。累加器模型确实考虑了这些战略选择过程测量，但 k 级和认知层次模型没有。© 2015 作者。John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 出版的《行为决策杂志》。