HIV/AIDS prevention funds are often allocated at multiple levels of decision-making. Optimal allocation of HIV prevention funds maximizes the number of HIV infections averted. However, decision makers often allocate using simple heuristics such as proportional allocation. We evaluate the impact of using incentives to encourage optimal allocation in a two-level decision-making process. We model an incentive based decision-making process consisting of an upper-level decision maker allocating funds to a single lower-level decision maker who then distributes funds to local programs. We assume that the lower-level utility function is linear in the amount of the budget received from the upper-level, the fraction of funds reserved for proportional allocation, and the number of infections averted. We assume that the upper level objective is to maximize the number of infections averted. We illustrate with an example using data from California, U.S.

HIV/AIDS 预防资金通常分配给多个决策层。艾滋病预防资金的最佳分配可以最大限度地避免艾滋病毒感染。但是，决策者通常使用简单的启发式方法进行分配，例如比例分配。我们评估了在两级决策过程中使用激励措施来鼓励优化分配的影响。我们模拟了一个基于激励的决策过程，该过程包括一个上级决策者将资金分配给一个下级决策者，然后后者将资金分配给本地项目。我们假设下级效用函数与从上级收到的预算金额、为比例分配预留的资金比例以及避免的感染数量呈线性关系。我们假设上层目标是最大化避免的感染数量。我们以美国加利福尼亚州的数据为例进行说明