Costly signaling has been proposed as a possible mechanism to explain food sharing in foraging populations. This sharing-as-signaling hypothesis predicts an association between sharing and status. Using exponential random graph modeling (ERGM), this prediction is tested on a social network of between-household food-sharing relationships in the fishing and sea-hunting village of Lamalera, Indonesia. Previous analyses (Nolin 2010) have shown that most sharing in Lamalera is consistent with reciprocal altruism. The question addressed here is whether any additional variation may be explained as sharing-as-signaling by high-status households. The results show that high-status households both give and receive more than other households, a pattern more consistent with reciprocal altruism than costly signaling. However, once the propensity to reciprocate and household productivity are controlled, households of men holding leadership positions show greater odds of unreciprocated giving when compared to households of non-leaders. This pattern of excessive giving by leaders is consistent with the sharing-as-signaling hypothesis. Wealthy households show the opposite pattern, giving less and receiving more than other households. These households may reciprocate in a currency other than food or their wealth may attract favor-seeking behavior from others. Overall, status covariates explain little variation in the sharing network as a whole, and much of the sharing observed by high-status households is best explained by the same factors that explain sharing by other households. This pattern suggests that multiple mechanisms may operate simultaneously to promote sharing in Lamalera and that signaling may motivate some sharing by some individuals even within sharing regimes primarily maintained by other mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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印度尼西亚拉马莱拉的食物共享网络：状态、共享和信号。

已经提出了昂贵的信号作为解释觅食人群食物共享的可能机制。这种共享作为信号的假设预测了共享和状态之间的关联。使用指数随机图模型 (ERGM)，该预测在印度尼西亚拉马莱拉捕鱼和海上狩猎村的家庭间食物共享关系的社交网络上进行了测试。之前的分析（Nolin 2010）表明，Lamalera 中的大多数分享与互惠利他主义是一致的。这里要解决的问题是，是否有任何额外的变化可以解释为高地位家庭的信号共享。结果表明，地位高的家庭给予和接受的都比其他家庭多，这种模式更符合互惠利他主义，而不是昂贵的信号。然而，一旦回报的倾向和家庭生产力得到控制，与非领导者的家庭相比，担任领导职位的男性家庭表现出更大的无回报捐赠的可能性。领导者过度给予的这种模式与“分享即信号”假设是一致的。富裕家庭表现出相反的模式，与其他家庭相比，给予较少而获得较多。这些家庭可能会用食物以外的货币来回报，或者他们的财富可能会吸引其他人的讨好行为。总体而言，地位协变量几乎不能解释整个共享网络的变化，而高地位家庭观察到的大部分共享可以用解释其他家庭共享的相同因素来最好地解释。