Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

中文翻译：

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心识是道德的本质

心灵感知需要将心理能力归因于其他实体，而道德判断需要将实体标记为好或坏，或者将行为标记为对或错。我们认为心灵感知是道德判断的本质。特别是，我们认为道德判断植根于两种感知思维的认知模板——有意行为者和受苦道德病人的道德二元组。不同的研究方向支持二元道德。首先，心灵感知与道德判断相关：心灵感知的维度（能动性和经验）映射到道德类型（主体和患者），而心灵感知的缺陷对应于道德判断的困难。其次，道德判断不仅对感知到的能动性和经验敏感，而且所有道德违规行为从根本上都被理解为能动性加上经历过的痛苦——即人际伤害——甚至是表面上无害的行为，例如违反纯洁性。第三，二元道德独特地解释了二元完成现象（看到代理人对患者做出反应，反之亦然）和道德类型塑造（将他人描述为道德代理人或道德患者）。讨论还探讨了心灵感知如何在解释层面上统一道德、如何在发展过程中获得道德的二元模板以及未来的方向。