Parties in real‐world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay reduction—potentially less harmful than magnitude increase—would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. The participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit‐for‐tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit‐for‐tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both the rewards and the punishments are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, the participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real‐world tit‐for‐tat conflicts, the decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

中文翻译：

---

合作的时间动态。

现实世界冲突中的各方经常试图惩罚彼此的行为。如果这种策略不能产生相互合作，他们可能会增加惩罚幅度。本实验调查了延迟减少（可能比幅度增加危害更小）是否会在重复交互时产生相互合作。参与者与玩以牙还牙策略的计算机进行囚徒困境博弈，参与者合作后合作，参与者叛逃后叛逃。对于一半的参与者来说，他们的选择和计算机的下一个选择之间的延迟相对于计算机的选择和他们的下一个选择之间的延迟而言是长的。对于另一半，长期和短期的延迟被逆转。针锋相对的意外事件加强了其他球员的力量 s 合作（通过合作）并惩罚其他玩家的背叛（通过背叛）。奖励和惩罚都因延迟而打折。与延迟折扣一致，当他们的选择与计算机的合作（奖励）或背叛（惩罚）之间的延迟相对较短时，参与者合作更多。这些结果表明，在现实世界的针锋相对的冲突中，减少互惠或报复的延迟可能与增加互惠或报复规模的更常见策略一样有效（或更有效）促进相互合作。版权所有 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 当他们的选择与计算机的合作（奖励）或背叛（惩罚）之间的延迟相对较短时，参与者的合作更多。这些结果表明，在现实世界的针锋相对的冲突中，减少互惠或报复的延迟可能与增加互惠或报复规模的更常见策略一样有效（或更有效）促进相互合作。版权所有 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 当他们的选择与计算机的合作（奖励）或背叛（惩罚）之间的延迟相对较短时，参与者的合作更多。这些结果表明，在现实世界的针锋相对的冲突中，减少互惠或报复的延迟可能与增加互惠或报复规模的更常见策略一样有效（或更有效）促进相互合作。版权所有 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 减少回报或报复的延迟可能会像增加回报或报复的更常见的策略一样有效（或更有效）促进相互合作。版权所有 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 减少回报或报复的延迟可能会像增加回报或报复的更常见的策略一样有效（或更有效）促进相互合作。版权所有 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.