Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards are a special class of games that combine features from both population games (infinitely many players) with stochastic games. We extend the theory for these games to the cases of total expected reward as well as to the expected average reward. We show that in the anonymous sequential game equilibria correspond to the limits of those of related finite population games as the number of players grows to infinity. We provide examples to illustrate our results.

中文翻译：

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具有未折扣奖励的固定匿名顺序游戏

具有未折扣奖励的固定匿名序列博弈是一类特殊的博弈，它结合了人口博弈（无限多的玩家）和随机博弈的特征。我们将这些游戏的理论扩展到总预期奖励以及预期平均奖励的情况。我们表明，在匿名序列博弈均衡中，随着玩家数量增长到无穷大，相关的有限人口博弈均衡对应于那些限制。我们提供示例来说明我们的结果。