The joint tax-subsidy policy is a typical form to implement the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) in several countries and cities. An understanding of EPR implementation mechanisms can help governments to impose proper taxes and subsidies which can further incubate ecological and environment-friendly manufacturing-recycling systems. This paper aims to investigate the joint tax-subsidy mechanism using game theory by considering a manufacturing-recycling system consisting of a government, a manufacturer, and a recycler. Results show that such joint tax-subsidy mechanism can motivate the manufacturer to pursue eco-innovation and to incorporate the recycling considerations into its production and eco-innovation decisions. The mechanism can reinforce the benefit of the eco-innovation to the manufacturer by adding revenue to the recycler, because higher revenue to the recycler leads to higher production quantity of the manufacturer. Eco-innovation factors and recycling factors that define the backgrounds of mechanism implementation are identified, managerial insights for governments into how to change the mechanism in response to different backgrounds are provided. This study provides a guideline for the government to design the joint tax-subsidy mechanism and a reference for firms to effectively fulfill their environmental responsibility.

联合税收补贴政策是在多个国家和城市实施生产者延伸责任制（EPR）的典型形式。对EPR实施机制的了解可以帮助政府征收适当的税收和补贴，从而进一步培育生态和环境友好的制造回收系统。本文旨在通过考虑由政府，制造商和回收商组成的制造回收系统，使用博弈论来研究联合税收补贴机制。结果表明，这种联合税收补贴机制可以激励制造商进行生态创新，并将回收考虑因素纳入其生产和生态创新决策中。该机制可以通过增加回收商的收入来增强生态创新对制造商的好处，因为回收商的收入增加导致制造商的生产量增加。确定了定义机制实施背景的生态创新因素和循环利用因素，并为政府提供了有关如何根据不同背景改变机制的管理见解。该研究为政府设计联合税收补贴机制提供了指导，为企业有效履行环境责任提供了参考。