In this review, we challenge the idea that directors are well positioned to be effective monitors of management. Moving beyond the logic of incentives and ability, we conceptualize a model based on the premise of boards as groups of individuals obtaining, processing and sharing information and explain how variation in information-processing demands at the director, board and firm level may challenge effective monitoring. We draw on multiple theoretical perspectives to identify these barriers to effective board monitoring. Our goal in reviewing these barriers is to help us take stock of existing research in corporate governance and to better explain board behavior beyond traditional agency and resource dependency accounts. We also aim to uncover gaps in the conceptual and empirical research and suggest areas of fruitful future research.

在本次审查中，我们挑战了董事应具备的条件，使其能够有效地监督管理人员。超越激励和能力的逻辑，我们以董事会为前提概念化模型，因为董事会是个人获取，处理和共享信息的群体，并解释了董事，董事会和公司层面信息处理需求的变化可能对有效监控产生挑战。我们使用多种理论观点来确定有效的董事会监控的这些障碍。我们克服这些障碍的目的是帮助我们评估公司治理方面的现有研究，并更好地解释传统机构和资源依赖账户以外的董事会行为。我们还旨在发现概念和实证研究中的空白，并提出富有成果的未来研究领域。