Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face a greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a new dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws. It is unfortunately an established fact that both men and womenfolk have, in utterly irresponsible manner, driven extravagance in dress and new styles to such shameful and wanton extremes that the different classes are barely to be known apart. —Nuremberg Ordnance of 1657, Quoted in Hunt (1996)

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地位竞争的政治经济学：前工业化欧洲的奢侈法

根据社会地位规范服装的禁欲法是前现代国家政治经济的重要组成部分。我们引入了一个模型，该模型体现了普通公民的消费对统治精英构成地位威胁的概念。我们的模型预测了收入的非单调效应——奢侈立法最初随着收入的增加而增加，但随后随着收入的进一步增加而下降。最初的崛起更有可能发生在那些榨取性机构较少的国家，这些国家的统治精英面临来自崛起的商业阶级的更大地位威胁。我们使用国家和城市层面的禁欲法的新数据集来测试这些预测。不幸的是，一个既定的事实是，男人和女人都以完全不负责任的方式，将奢侈的服饰和新的款式推向可耻和肆意的极端，以至于不同的阶级几乎无法区分。——1657 年纽伦堡军械，引自 Hunt (1996)