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The Limits of Interest: Moral economy and public engagement in the regulation of derivatives in the United States
Regulation & Governance ( IF 3.203 ) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 , DOI: 10.1111/rego.12579
J. Nicholas Ziegler 1 , Konrad Posch 2, 3 , Thomas Nath 4
Affiliation  

This article analyzes the public comments submitted to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 2010–2014, in response to proposed rules for implementing the Dodd-Frank reforms. By addressing a fine-grained typology of commenting organizations to a topic model of the combined comments, we illuminate a new pattern of public engagement in financial regulation. Contrary to the economic concept of regulatory capture, our data show no sharp divide between the suppliers of complex derivatives (the dealer banks) and their customers in other parts of the finance industry. In keeping with the general concept of financialization—but contrary to its strongest versions—our data show distinctly delimited evidence of a convergence between the banks and other sectors. Instead of either capture or all-embracing financialization, the comments submitted to the CFTC display an overriding opposition in the justifications used by commenters to explain their preferences. Commenters from the financial services and allied sectors consistently adopt a language of technical legitimation. Commenters in agriculture, livestock, retail energy, and many nonmarket organizations adopt a language of moral justification. The clarity of the divide between these two idioms indicates that the underlying purposes of new financial instruments are now being questioned. Even in the realm of esoteric financial instruments such as derivatives, the moral economy of market competition is once again subject to debate among market participants as well as observers.

中文翻译:

利益的限度:美国衍生品监管中的道德经济和公众参与

本文分析了 2010 年至 2014 年提交给商品期货交易委员会 (CFTC) 的公众意见,以回应实施多德弗兰克改革的拟议规则。通过将评论组织的细粒度类型解决为组合评论的主题模型,我们阐明了公众参与金融监管的新模式。与监管捕获的经济概念相反,我们的数据显示复杂衍生品的供应商(交易商银行)与其金融行业其他部分的客户之间没有明显的分歧。与金融化的一般概念保持一致(但与其最强有力的版本相反),我们的数据显示了银行与其他部门之间趋同的明显界限证据。提交给美国商品期货交易委员会的评论没有捕获或全面的金融化,而是对评论者用来解释其偏好的理由表现出压倒性的反对。来自金融服务和相关部门的评论者一致采用技术合法性的语言。农业、畜牧业、零售能源和许多非市场组织的评论者采用道德辩护的语言。这两个习语之间的明确区别表明,新金融工具的根本目的现在受到质疑。即使在衍生品等深奥的金融工具领域,市场竞争的道德经济也再次成为市场参与者和观察者之间争论的焦点。
更新日期:2024-02-13
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