To cut pollution at sea, The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) plans to include the shipping industry. Carriers may evade EU ETS by adding a non-EU port-of-call as their first port-of-call to EU ports. In this context, we develop a game model to analyze the incentives of two competing carriers to adopt the port-of-call strategy and the effect of EU ETS. Moreover, based on the European line, an empirical study is carried out to explore potential ways to improve the effect of the EU ETS. We show that carriers have a stronger incentive to adopt the port-of-call strategy when the carbon quota price is high. It is observed that a win-win situation arises when both carriers adopt the port-of-call strategy, which represents the Pareto-optimal choice. Conversely, if both carriers opt for the direct access strategy, it will result in a lose-lose situation similar to the typical Prisoner's Dilemma. Interestingly, we also find that EU ETS is not always effective in reducing emissions and may, in some cases, even increase carbon emissions.

中文翻译：

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欧盟排放交易体系下竞争性海运承运人的规避策略选择

为了减少海上污染，欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）计划将航运业纳入其中。承运人可以通过添加非欧盟停靠港作为其前往欧盟港口的第一个停靠港来规避欧盟排放交易体系。在此背景下，我们开发了一个博弈模型来分析两个竞争运营商采用停靠港策略的激励以及欧盟排放交易体系的效果。此外，基于欧洲线，进行了实证研究，探索提高EU ETS效果的潜在途径。我们发现，当碳配额价格较高时，承运人采用停靠港策略的动机更强。据观察，当两家运营商都采用停靠港策略时，就会出现双赢的局面，这代表了帕累托最优选择。相反，如果两家运营商都选择直接接入策略，则会导致类似于典型的囚徒困境的双输局面。有趣的是，我们还发现欧盟排放交易体系并不总是能有效减少排放，在某些情况下甚至可能增加碳排放。