The effects of food product quality disclosure on enhancing food quality transparency have drawn wide attention to food supply chain management. However, demand information asymmetry in the vertical direction of food supply chains hinders the supplier’s quality disclosure due to the fact that the supplier is uncertain whether the profits brought by quality disclosure can offset the disclosure costs. To overcome this challenge, this paper analyzes the information interaction in food supply chains including one leading supplier who provides consumers food with uncertain quality information and two following retailers who own demand information privately; the supplier provides preservation service for the food to stimulate the demand and makes the quality disclosure decision based on the profit trade-off between disclosure and not disclosure. Our research shows that cost-effective preservation service can stimulate two retailers to share information. To avoid high information leakage, two retailers will face the prisoner’s dilemma when they achieve the final equilibrium under certain conditions. If the supplier discloses information about food with high quality, it will deepen the information leakage. Higher preservation service efficiency can avoid the retailers’ prisoner’s dilemma, whereas information disclosure of high-quality products may make the prisoner’s dilemma worse. The numerical example shows that more accurate information signals and more intense competition urge the supplier to disclose quality information. A subsidy mechanism is designed for the supplier to motivate the retailers to provide information, which enables supply chain members to gain more profits.

中文翻译：

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食品供应链中需求信息不对称的质量披露策略

食品质量披露对提高食品质量透明度的作用引起了食品供应链管理的广泛关注。然而，食品供应链垂直方向的需求信息不对称，由于供应商不确定质量披露带来的利润能否抵消披露成本，阻碍了供应商的质量披露。为了克服这一挑战，本文分析了食品供应链中的信息交互，其中包括一个向消费者提供不确定质量信息的领先供应商和两个私下拥有需求信息的零售商；供应商为食品提供保鲜服务以刺激需求，并根据披露与不披露之间的利润权衡做出质量披露决策。我们的研究表明，具有成本效益的保存服务可以刺激两家零售商共享信息。为了避免大量的信息泄露，两个零售商在一定条件下达到最终均衡时将面临囚徒困境。如果供应商高质量地披露食品信息，就会加深信息泄露。较高的保鲜服务效率可以避免零售商的囚徒困境，而优质产品的信息泄露可能会使囚徒困境更加严重。数值例子表明，更准确的信息信号和更激烈的竞争促使供应商披露质量信息。为供应商设计补贴机制，激励零售商提供信息，使供应链成员获得更多利润。