How do states’ positions across multiple and interconnected economic networks affect their power? The Weaponized Interdependence (WI) scholarship emphasizes that states centrally located in global economic networks have access to new sources of coercion. In this paper, we look at how their positions across multiple networks interact with each other to create new opportunities and vulnerabilities. We use network analysis to map the semiconductor supply chain and show that it can be viewed as four interrelated networks: (1) design, (2) raw material, (3) manufacturing equipment, and (4) assembled chips. We then highlight how states’ centrality varies across these networks and how it shapes their respective opportunities for coercion. Looking specifically at the United States, we emphasize how its centrality in the design network enables it to weaponize chokepoints in the trade network of assembled chips. In so doing the paper makes three contributions. First, it highlights how interactions among multiple economic networks provide new opportunities for states to weaponize interdependence. Second, it contributes to recent attempts using network analysis to analyze structural power on the global stage. Last, it demonstrates how network methodology can help detect potential (ab)uses of WI and how the potential for weaponization evolves over time.

中文翻译：

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半导体供应链中的跨网络武器化

国家在多个相互关联的经济网络中的地位如何影响其权力？武器化相互依存（WI）奖学金强调，位于全球经济网络中心的国家可以获得新的胁迫来源。在本文中，我们研究了他们在多个网络中的位置如何相互作用以创造新的机会和漏洞。我们使用网络分析来绘制半导体供应链，并表明它可以被视为四个相互关联的网络：（1）设计，（2）原材料，（3）制造设备和（4）组装芯片。然后，我们强调国家的中心地位在这些网络中如何变化，以及它如何塑造各自的强制机会。具体以美国为例，我们强调其在设计网络中的中心地位如何使其能够将组装芯片贸易网络中的瓶颈武器化。在此过程中，本文做出了三项贡献。首先，它强调了多个经济网络之间的相互作用如何为各国将相互依赖武器化提供新的机会。其次，它有助于最近尝试使用网络分析来分析全球舞台上的结构性力量。最后，它展示了网络方法如何帮助检测 WI 的潜在（滥用）用途，以及武器化的潜力如何随着时间的推移而演变。