The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that the regulation of the safety of civil nuclear power requires national regulatory agencies to be effectively independent. However, in the early years of national civil nuclear power programs national nuclear industries were dominated by iron triangles or subgovernments of powerful actors with an interest in promoting the industry. The creation of an independent safety regulator requires a radical restructuring of the national governance framework. Windows of opportunity or critical junctures for such reform occur only occasionally. This paper examines the cases of France, Japan, and India to identify the factors that determine the degree of success in attempts to break the power of nuclear iron triangles or subgovernments and create an effectively independent regulator. This analysis shows a serious nuclear accident can create the opportunity to dismantle an iron triangle. The extent and speed with which reforms can be implemented depend greatly on pre-existing and prevailing conditions. Key determinants include the power structures and attitudes toward nuclear power in elite politics, the degree of engagement of civil society, and pressures from international organizations. Of these, the first, elite politics, appears to be the most important in these three cases.

中文翻译：

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打破核安全监管铁三角：法国、日本和印度的案例

国际原子能机构声称，民用核电安全监管要求各国监管机构保持有效独立。然而，在国家民用核电计划的早期，国家核工业由铁三角或有兴趣促进该行业发展的强大参与者的地方政府主导。建立独立的安全监管机构需要对国家治理框架进行彻底的重组。这种改革的机会之窗或关键时刻只是偶尔出现。本文研究了法国、日本和印度的案例，以确定决定打破核铁三角或地方政府权力并创建有效独立监管机构的成功程度的因素。这一分析表明，严重的核事故可以创造拆除铁三角的机会。改革实施的程度和速度在很大程度上取决于现有条件和普遍条件。关键的决定因素包括精英政治中的权力结构和对核电的态度、公民社会的参与程度以及来自国际组织的压力。其中，第一个，精英政治，在这三种情况下似乎是最重要的。