The classic view assumes banks prioritize immediate repayment by selling assets until default. We endogenize run frequency and study how general settlement rules trade off liquidity provision net of fire sale losses against induced run incentives. Panic runs are eliminated when all illiquid assets are sold under orderly resolution, but liquidity provision in a run is minimal. When suspension after some fire sales is followed by immediate liquidation, run frequency falls then rises in suspension delay. Thus, optimal suspension may require some sale of illiquid assets, in contrast to MMF norms. Ex post discretion induces excessive liquidation and more frequent runs.

中文翻译：

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付款、停留还是延迟？如何解决跑步问题

经典观点认为，银行优先考虑通过出售资产直至违约来立即偿还债务。我们将运行频率内生化，并研究一般结算规则如何权衡扣除甩卖损失后的流动性供应与诱导运行激励之间的关系。当所有非流动性资产按照有序解决方案出售时，恐慌性挤兑就会被消除，但挤兑中的流动性供应却很少。当一些甩卖后暂停并立即清算时，运行频率会下降，然后暂停延迟会上升。因此，与MMF规范相反，最佳暂停可能需要出售一些非流动资产。事后酌处权会导致过度清算和更频繁的挤兑。