Models of decision-making typically assume the existence of some common currency of value, such as utility, happiness, or inclusive fitness. This common currency is taken to allow comparison of options and to underpin everyday choice. Here we suggest instead that there is no universal value scale, that incommensurable values pervade everyday choice, and hence that most existing models of decision-making in both economics and psychology are fundamentally limited. We propose that choice objects can be compared only with reference to specific but nonuniversal "covering values." These covering values may reflect decision-makers' goals, motivations, or current states. A complete model of choice must accommodate the range of possible covering values. We show that abandoning the common-currency assumption in models of judgment and decision-making necessitates rank-based and "simple heuristics" models that contrast radically with conventional utility-based approaches. We note that if there is no universal value scale, then Arrow's impossibility theorem places severe bounds on the rationality of individual decision-making and hence that there is a deep link between the incommensurability of value, inconsistencies in human decision-making, and rank-based coding of value. More generally, incommensurability raises the question of whether it will ever be possible to develop single-quantity-maximizing models of decision-making.

中文翻译：

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选择的不可比性和不可通约性：没有共同的价值货币？

决策模型通常假设存在某种共同的价值货币，例如效用、幸福感或包容性适应性。采用这种共同货币是为了允许比较选项并支持日常选择。相反，我们在这里建议，不存在普遍的价值尺度，不可通约的价值普遍存在于日常选择中，因此经济学和心理学中大多数现有的决策模型从根本上都是有限的。我们建议只能参考特定但非通用的“覆盖值”来比较选择对象。这些涵盖的价值观可能反映决策者的目标、动机或当前状态。选择的完整模型必须适应可能的覆盖值范围。我们表明，放弃判断和决策模型中的共同货币假设需要基于排名和“简单启发式”模型，这与传统的基于效用的方法截然不同。我们注意到，如果不存在普遍的价值尺度，那么阿罗不可能定理就会对个人决策的合理性施加严格的限制，因此，价值的不可通约性、人类决策的不一致和等级之间存在着深刻的联系。基于值的编码。更一般地说，不可通约性提出了一个问题：是否有可能开发出单一数量最大化的决策模型。