Why does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exit its lending relationships before member states have resolved their financial crises? It is particularly surprising given that the IMF often resumes its lending shortly after its withdrawal. We argue that IMF withdrawals are conditioned by global contagion risk. The tension between the IMF's mandate of global financial stability and its limited financial resources compels the IMF's early exit from its lending relationships. During periods of high global contagion, the IMF prioritizes its mandate by continuing its lending despite noncompliance. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, and willingly cuts its lending ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative analysis of IMF decision-making in two of its largest borrowers, Argentina and Greece, we find supportive evidence for our claims.

中文翻译：

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全球蔓延风险和国际货币基金组织信贷周期：紧急出口和旋转门

为什么国际货币基金组织（IMF）在成员国解决金融危机之前就退出贷款关系？鉴于国际货币基金组织经常在退出后不久恢复贷款，这一点尤其令人惊讶。我们认为，国际货币基金组织的退出是以全球蔓延风险为条件的。国际货币基金组织全球金融稳定的使命与其有限的金融资源之间的紧张关系迫使国际货币基金组织提前退出其贷款关系。在全球疫情严重蔓延期间，国际货币基金组织优先履行其职责，尽管存在违规行为，但仍继续提供贷款。然而，当国际货币基金组织认为传染风险最小时，它就会关注道德风险，并愿意切断贷款关系，以维护其声誉和应对未来危机的资源。通过对国际货币基金组织对其两个最大借款国阿根廷和希腊的决策进行比较分析，我们找到了支持我们主张的证据。