Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly.

中文翻译：

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压力测试和银行贷款

压力测试传达了有关未来测试严格程度的信息，从而激励银行改变未来的贷款行为。监管机构认识到并利用这种影响：他们可能会进行较温和的压力测试以鼓励放贷，或进行较严格的压力测试以减少冒险行为。当（a）测试失去可信度或（b）测试变得自我实现时，这种信息管理可能会导致效率低下。此外，银行可能会因预期压力测试设计而扭曲其贷款行为，从而导致进一步的盈余损失。该分析更广泛地适用于银行业监管。