A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that agent. The challenge posed by self-effacing reasons bears important structural similarities with a range of epistemic paradoxes, most notably the Knowability Paradox. In this article, we investigate the similarities and differences between the two arguments. Moreover, we assess whether some of the approaches to the Knowability Paradox could help solve the challenge posed by self-effacing reasons. We argue that at least two popular approaches to the paradox can be turned into promising strategies for addressing the self-effacing reasons problem.

中文翻译：

---

谦逊的原因和认知约束：可知性悖论的一些教训

对规范原因的最小限制似乎是，如果某个事实是代理人执行 φ（行动、相信或感觉）的理由，则代理人可能会知道该事实。这种限制受到一种众所周知的反例的威胁。自我谦逊的理由是直观地构成代理人的理由的事实，但如果这些事实为人所知，它们将不再是该代理人的理由。谦逊的原因所带来的挑战与一系列认知悖论（尤其是可知性悖论）具有重要的结构相似性。在本文中，我们研究了这两个论点之间的异同。此外，我们评估了一些解决可知性悖论的方法是否有助于解决由谦逊的原因带来的挑战。我们认为，至少有两种流行的解决悖论的方法可以转化为解决谦逊原因问题的有前途的策略。