We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.

中文翻译：

---

常见的风险投资人和初创企业的成长

当投资者在相互冲突的商业机会中持有股份时，我们利用交错引入的责任豁免作为对风险投资（VC）投资和董事网络的冲击。法律修改后，我们发现行业内风险投资和在初创公司董事会任职的普通董事有所增加。尽管存在提取租金的潜力，但风投投资组合内的同行业初创企业可以通过筹集更多资本、减少失败和更成功退出而受益。在其他初创公司董事会任职的风险投资董事是与积极成果相关的主要机制，这与促进风险投资组合信息交流的常见风险投资一致。