The normativity of so-called ‘coherence’ or ‘structural’ requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip’s recent account. It first argues that Worsnip’s account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip’s account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to.

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什么是结构理性？

近年来，所谓合理性的“连贯性”或“结构性”要求的规范性一直受到激烈争论。然而，如果结构理性最终不是对理性做出正确反应的问题，那么关于结构理性的本质，或者是什么使一系列态度在结构上非理性，人们却相对较少地谈论。本文对不连贯性（或结构性非理性）进行了新颖的描述，批判性地审视了亚历克斯·沃斯尼普最近的描述。它首先认为沃斯尼普的叙述过度生成和生成了不连贯的态度模式，然后提出了一种替代方案，既避免了这些问题，又抓住了沃斯尼普叙述背后的重要见解。根据这个账目，