How do ultra-religious schools respond to state regulations that conflict with deep-rooted cultural norms? This study investigates this question in the context of Haredi boys schools' decisions regarding Israel's core-curriculum regulations. It draws on a first-of-its-kind dataset of interviews and school data collected from a representative sample of 82 principals and teachers in schools serving 18,000 students and six government inspectors overseeing dozens of schools. We identify isomorphic structures of compliance and noncompliance and analyze the law's role among the competing sources of schools' decisions. These sources include rabbis, nongovernmental network supervisors, private consultants, models set by other schools, resource constraints, parents, and personal opinions. The findings reveal a tension between the law's overarching role in setting the baseline for schools' decisions and its under-enforcement. We conceptualize this tension as a manifestation of coupled institutional maintenance, whereby ultra-religious schools and government inspectors collaborate to maintain schools' noncompliance and autonomy.

中文翻译：

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不遵守法律作为极端宗教学校的制度维护

极端宗教学校如何应对与根深蒂固的文化规范相冲突的国家法规？本研究在正统男校关于以色列核心课程规定的决定的背景下调查了这个问题。它利用了首个包含访谈和学校数据的数据集，该数据集是从为 18,000 名学生服务的学校中的 82 名校长和教师以及负责监督数十所学校的 6 名政府督察中收集的代表性样本。我们识别了合规和不合规的同构结构，并分析了法律在学校决策的竞争来源中的作用。这些来源包括拉比、非政府网络监管者、私人顾问、其他学校设定的模型、资源限制、家长和个人意见。调查结果揭示了该法律在设定学校决策基准方面的首要作用与其执行不力之间的紧张关系。我们将这种紧张关系概念化为耦合制度维护的表现，即极端宗教学校和政府督察合作维持学校的不合规性和自主权。