In the fallout of the 2008 crisis, macroprudential policy has been installed as the policy remedy against future financial instability, a primary focus being developments in the real estate sector. With house prices consistently rising in the EU since 2014, causing alarm among macroprudential supervisory bodies, a core question of EU regulatory governance is how far macroprudential bodies have been capable of bringing about countercyclical actions against the build-up of such vulnerabilities. This paper investigates this question using a novel dataset of macroprudential intensity coded for the 17 EU countries that experienced real estate vulnerabilities post-euro crisis. Specifically, it asks which configuration of conditions account for the (in)capacity of countries to impose stringent countercyclical regulations against housing booms? Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis technics coupled with qualitative analysis of country cases using expert interviews, we find that the absence of political salience of homeownership and the political independence of macroprudential authorities to be crucial conditions that jointly explain countercyclical macroprudential activity. These findings, which show two pathways to action have implications for the capacity of the EU to prevent future crises and future reform of the EU prudential framework.

中文翻译：

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遏制欧盟房地产繁荣：采取宏观审慎（实施）行动的途径

2008年危机爆发后，宏观审慎政策被作为应对未来金融不稳定的政策补救措施，主要关注点是房地产行业的发展。自2014年以来，欧盟房价持续上涨，引起了宏观审慎监管机构的警惕，欧盟监管治理的一个核心问题是，宏观审慎机构在多大程度上能够针对此类脆弱性的累积采取反周期行动。本文使用一个新颖的宏观审慎强度数据集来研究这个问题，该数据集针对欧元危机后经历过房地产脆弱性的 17 个欧盟国家进行编码。具体来说，它询问哪种条件配置导致国家有能力对房地产繁荣实施严格的反周期监管？利用模糊集定性比较分析技术，结合专家访谈对国家案例进行定性分析，我们发现，住房所有权的政治显着性缺失和宏观审慎当局的政治独立性是共同解释反周期宏观审慎活动的关键条件。这些发现显示了两种行动途径，对欧盟预防未来危机的能力和欧盟审慎框架的未来改革产生影响。