A recent, seemingly appealing version of the powerful qualities view defines properties’ qualitativity via an essentialist claim and their powerfulness via a grounding claim. Roughly, this approach holds that properties are qualities because they have qualitative essences, while they are powerful because their instances or essences ground causal-modal facts. I argue that this theory should be replaced with one that defines the powerfulness of qualities in terms of both a grounding claim and a ‘meta-grounding’ claim. Specifically, I formulate and defend a view on which qualities are powerful just if instances of those qualities at least partially ground dispositions in virtue of the essences of those qualities.

最近，看似吸引人的强大品质观点版本通过本质主义主张定义了属性的定性，并通过基础主张定义了属性的强大性。粗略地说，这种方法认为属性是质量，因为它们具有定性的本质，而它们是强大的，因为它们的实例或本质基于因果模态事实。我认为应该用一种根据基础主张和“元基础”主张来定义品质的力量的理论来取代这一理论。具体来说，我提出并捍卫一种观点，即哪些品质是强大的，只要这些品质的实例至少部分地基于这些品质的本质来奠定倾向。