This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be normatively fundamental, views which analyze reasons as evidence concerning what one ought to do, views which analyze reasons in terms of good reasoning, and views which analyze reasons as explanations of ought-facts, fittingness-facts, or goodness-facts.

本文解决了如何最好地理解规范原因的“权重”或“强度”的问题。我们认为，考虑到我们更喜欢将原因作为规范支持的来源进行分析，这个问题有一个直截了当的答案：规范原因的权重只是它提供了多少支持的问题。我们还批判性地讨论了关于原因及其重要性的几种相互竞争的观点。这些包括将理由作为规范基础的观点，将理由分析为关于一个人应该做什么的证据的观点，根据良好推理分析理由的观点，以及将理由分析为对应该事实、适合性事实的解释的观点，或善良的事实。