This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative metaphysical vagueness. Positive metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) the claim that there is vagueness in the world; negative metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) the claim that there is vagueness that is not in our language or thought. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist’s commitment to vague existence comes with positive metaphysical vagueness—even if it doesn't require negative metaphysical vagueness.

中文翻译：

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量词方差、模糊存在和形而上学模糊

本文问：量词变体主义者是否致力于形而上学的模糊性？我对这个问题的调查是通过对模糊存在的研究来进行的。我将争辩说，量词变体论者致力于模糊存在，而变体论者提出的模糊存在需要一种令人费解的形而上学模糊性。具体来说，我区分（我所说的）积极和消极的形而上学模糊性。积极形而上学的模糊性（大致）是世界上存在模糊性的主张；消极形而上学的模糊性（大致）是声称存在不在我们的语言或思想中的模糊性。我将争辩说，量词变体主义者对模糊存在的承诺伴随着积极的形而上学模糊——即使它不需要消极的形而上学模糊。