Re-distributive policies are often used by governments to forestall conflict. This paper analyzes the evolution of rural conflict in a region of 1930s Spain in which fast transfers of land using temporal expropriations were aimed at reducing poverty and mitigate conflict. Using a subset of exogenous land transfers, we document that these transfers did not reduce conflict. If anything, they increased some types of conflicts for several months after implementation. The short run increase in conflict is consistent with two potential side effects of land reforms. First, land reforms can boost the collective action of beneficiaries. Second, poorly designed reforms can reduce the incomes of beneficiaries.

政府经常使用再分配政策来预防冲突。本文分析了 1930 年代西班牙某个地区农村冲突的演变，在该地区，使用临时征用的土地快速转让旨在减少贫困和缓解冲突。使用外生土地转让的子集，我们证明这些转让并没有减少冲突。如果有的话，他们在实施后的几个月内增加了某些类型的冲突。冲突的短期增加与土地改革的两个潜在副作用是一致的。首先，土地改革可以促进受益者的集体行动。其次，设计不当的改革会减少受益人的收入。