This study develops a game theoretical model with two-competing hardware/software platforms, to examine whether a platform should charge consumers for first-party content, or offer it for free. Four strategies are considered: both platforms charge, both platforms offer the content for free, one platform charges and the other offers the content for free. As the platforms are two-sided, third-party content developers (TDs) can join and provide third-party content to consumers on the platforms. We find that two driving factors, the degree of cross-side network effect (DCNE) and function matching degree of the free version (FMDFV), affect the two platforms’ Nash equilibrium strategies. Unlike the monopolistic platform, who always chooses to charge consumers for first-party content, under a duopoly competition setting either both platforms charge for first-party content, or both platforms offer free first-party content. Interestingly, we find that a prisoner's dilemma arises when DCNE and FMDFV are both small and when the Nash equilibrium strategy is for both platforms to charge for first-party content. In addition, when both platforms charge for first-party content, a win-win outcome can be achieved for the two platforms and the consumers, if DCNE is moderately large and FMDFV is small. Interestingly, we find that it is unnecessary for a platform to charge a profit-making price to consumers or a profit-making access fee to TDs.

本研究开发了一个具有两个竞争的硬件/软件平台的博弈论模型，以研究平台是否应该向消费者收取第一方内容的费用，还是免费提供。考虑四种策略：两个平台都收费，两个平台免费提供内容，一个平台收费，另一个平台免费提供内容。由于平台是双向的，第三方内容开发商（TD）可以加入并向平台上的消费者提供第三方内容。我们发现，跨边网络效应程度（DCNE）和免费版本的功能匹配度（FMDFV）两个驱动因素影响两个平台的纳什均衡策略。与垄断平台总是选择向消费者收取第一方内容的费用不同，在双头垄断竞争环境下，要么两个平台都对第一方内容收费，要么两个平台都提供免费的第一方内容。有趣的是，我们发现当 DCNE 和 FMDFV 都很小时，并且纳什均衡策略是两个平台对第一方内容收费时，就会出现囚徒困境。另外，当两个平台都对第一方内容收费时，如果DCNE规模适中，FMDFV规模较小，则可以实现两个平台和消费者的双赢。有趣的是，我们发现平台没有必要向消费者收取营利性价格或对TD收取营利性接入费。我们发现，当 DCNE 和 FMDFV 都很小时，并且纳什均衡策略是两个平台都对第一方内容收费时，就会出现囚徒困境。另外，当两个平台都对第一方内容收费时，如果DCNE规模适中，FMDFV规模较小，则可以实现两个平台和消费者的双赢。有趣的是，我们发现平台没有必要向消费者收取营利性价格或对TD收取营利性接入费。我们发现，当 DCNE 和 FMDFV 都很小时，并且纳什均衡策略是两个平台都对第一方内容收费时，就会出现囚徒困境。另外，当两个平台都对第一方内容收费时，如果DCNE规模适中，FMDFV规模较小，则可以实现两个平台和消费者的双赢。有趣的是，我们发现平台没有必要向消费者收取营利性价格或对TD收取营利性接入费。