Elinor Mason has provided an account of blame and blameworthiness that is pluralistic. There are, broadly speaking, three ways in which we aptly blame -- and ordinary sense, directed at those with poor quality of the will, and then a detached sense and an extended sense, in which blame is aptly directed towards those without poor quality of the will as it is normally understood. In this essay I explore and critically discuss Mason's account. While I argue that she has identified interesting aspects of the way in which we hold people morally responsible, I disagree with certain features of the account, in particular, that ordinary blame issues in demands and that there is any deep sense in which we can simply decide to take on responsibility.

埃莉诺·梅森 (Elinor Mason) 提供了多元的责备和可责备性说明。从广义上讲，我们可以通过三种方式恰当地责备——普通意义上的，针对那些意志质量差的人，然后是一种超然的感觉和广义的方式，在这些方式中，我们恰当地责备那些意志质量差的人通常理解的意愿。在这篇文章中，我探索并批判性地讨论了梅森的叙述。虽然我认为她已经确定了我们让人们负有道德责任的方式的有趣方面，但我不同意该帐户的某些特征，特别是普通的责备问题在要求中，并且有任何深刻的意义，我们可以简单地决定承担责任。