It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: moral features only make it harder for attitudes to secure epistemic merits. I argue that, if attitudes can incur moral injury, failure to form attitudes can too. To make sense of this, I contend, attitude-based accounts require symmetric mechanisms, allowing that moral considerations make it both harder and easier for attitudes to attain epistemic merits. I maintain that, once we recognize this, attitude-based encroachment views must soon concede that they sometimes demand we believe against the evidence.

人们普遍认为，尽管存在道德缺陷，但我们的信念在认识上可以是完美无缺的。道德侵犯理论对此提出质疑，认为道德考量与我们态度的认知地位有关。根据基于态度的道德侵犯理论，道德侵犯了我们态度的认知地位，因为我们可以用我们的认知实践在道德上伤害他人。在本文中，我旨在表明当前基于态度的理论具有不对称机制：道德特征只会使态度更难获得认知价值。我认为，如果态度会招致道德伤害，那么未能形成态度也可能。为了理解这一点，我认为，基于态度的账户需要对称机制，允许道德考虑使态度更难和更容易获得认知价值。我坚持认为，一旦我们认识到这一点，基于态度的侵犯观点必须很快承认它们有时会要求我们相信证据。