This paper examines the effect of the monitoring attention of institutional investors on firms’ trade credit financing. We document that trade credit financing is positively affected by the monitoring attention of the firm's institutional owners. Notably, only institutional investors with the highest monitoring attention can positively affect the firm's account payables, which is consistent with the intervention channel. Meanwhile, institutional investors with low monitoring attention negatively affect trade credit financing, which is consistent with the exit channel of institutional investors. Our findings support the view that the efficacy of institutional monitoring mainly depends on the ownership held by motivated monitoring institutions.

JEL classification

G23, G30, G32, G34

中文翻译：

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监测机构投资者的注意力和贸易信贷融资

本文考察了机构投资者的监督注意力对企业贸易信贷融资的影响。我们记录了贸易信贷融资受到公司机构所有者的监督关注的积极影响。值得注意的是，只有监督关注度最高的机构投资者才能对公司的应付账款产生正向影响，这与干预渠道一致。同时，监管关注度低的机构投资者对贸易信贷融资产生负面影响，这与机构投资者的退出渠道一致。我们的研究结果支持这样一种观点，即机构监督的有效性主要取决于积极监督机构持有的所有权。

JEL分类

G23、G30、G32、G34