A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit–value biconditionals. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit–value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.

一个笑话是有趣的，当且仅当它适合被它逗乐时；当且仅当后悔是适当的时候，一种行为才是令人遗憾的。许多哲学家接受这些双条件，并认为类似的双条件可以在广泛的附加评价属性和相应反应的拟合度之间获得。将这些称为拟合值双条件。双条件为我们提供了一种系统的方法来认识适合性在我们的道德实践中的作用；它们也是各种元伦理项目的基石，例如价值观的契合态度分析和“契合第一”方法。然而，尽管双条件句很重要，但对其正确解释的讨论却很少。本文认为，对拟合值双条件的任何合理解释都必须消除几种明显的反例。例如，一项成就值得骄傲并不意味着我适合为此感到自豪，因为该成就可能不是我的或我身边的任何人的；一个笑话很有趣并不意味着我适合连续六个月被它逗乐；一个人可爱并不意味着我适合浪漫地爱他，因为那个人可能是我的兄弟姐妹。我们考虑对此类反例的可能反应，并制定我们认为最有希望的双条件解释。结果是，某些关于适合性及其与价值和理由的关系的广泛假设应该被重新考虑。