Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences, they argue, risk committing “the moralistic fallacy”, a mistake they claim is widespread throughout the work of contemporary and historical moral philosophers. I argue that many basic and familiar forms of moral assessment of the emotions are not subject to these arguments. I illustrate this by reconsidering the idea that to assess an emotion as “fitting” is to assess it as what a virtuous person would feel. After showing how assessments akin to this “virtue-theoretical” notion of fit may be prevalent even outside of the Aristotelian tradition, I suggest some more charitable and philosophically productive interpretations of the philosophical views of the emotions that D'Arms and Jacobson criticize, and argue that we cannot coherently theorize about the fittingness conditions of the emotions in a morally neutral way.

中文翻译：

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身材好1

哲学家现在对将某种情感的“适宜性”或准确性与对该情感的任何形式的道德评估混为一谈持谨慎态度。贾斯汀·达姆斯 (Justin D'Arms) 和丹尼尔·雅各布森 (Daniel Jacobson) 最初对这种“混为一谈”提出了警告，他们也警告哲学家，不要因为感觉一种情绪在道德上不恰当而推断它是不准确的，也不要因为感觉它在道德上不恰当而推断它是准确的。在道德上是适当的。他们认为，这种推论有犯“道德谬误”的风险，他们声称这一错误在当代和历史道德哲学家的著作中普遍存在。我认为许多基本且熟悉的情感道德评估形式不受这些论点的影响。我通过重新考虑这个想法来说明这一点，即评估一种情绪是否“合适”就是将其评估为一个有道德的人的感受。在展示了类似于这种“美德理论”的适合概念的评估如何在亚里士多德传统之外也很普遍之后，我建议对达姆斯和雅各布森批评的情感哲学观点进行一些更慈善和哲学上富有成效的解释，以及认为我们不能以道德中立的方式对情绪的适应性条件进行连贯的理论。