To reconcile the standard possible worlds model of knowledge with the intuition that ordinary agents fall far short of logical omniscience, a Stalnakerian strategy appeals to two components. The first is the idea that mathematical and logical knowledge is at bottom metalinguistic knowledge. The second is the idea that non-ideal minds are often fragmented. In this paper, we investigate this Stalnakerian reconciliation strategy and argue, ultimately, that it fails. We are not the first to complain about the Stalnakerian strategy. But in contrast to existing complaints, we want to cause trouble for the strategy directly on its home turf. That is, we will advance our objection while granting both the plausibility of the fragmentation component—save for an extreme version of it—and that of the metalinguistic component. Once our central objection to the Stalnakerian strategy is in place, we will show how it negatively affects Adam Elga and Augustín Rayo’s recent attempt to apply the Stalnakerian strategy in the context of Bayesian decision theory.

为了调和标准的可能世界知识模型与普通代理人远远达不到逻辑全知的直觉，Stalnakerian 策略呼吁两个组成部分。第一个是认为数学和逻辑知识本质上是元语言知识的观点。第二个是非理想的思想往往是支离破碎的想法。在本文中，我们调查了这种 Stalnakerian 和解策略，并最终证明它失败了。我们不是第一个抱怨 Stalnakerian 战略的人。但与现有的抱怨相反，我们想直接在其主场给该战略带来麻烦。也就是说，我们将提出我们的反对意见，同时承认碎片成分的合理性——除了它的极端版本​​——和元语言成分的合理性。一旦我们对 Stalnakerian 策略的主要反对意见到位，