This article discusses explanations behind theory choice, that is, ultimately, what leads people to accept a certain claim as valid. There has been a recent debate as to how closure was achieved in the continental-drift discussion. The controversy had found its usual explanation under rationalist terms: Wegener’s 1912 continental-drift theory was accepted 50 years later only after the plate tectonic theory had provided more evidence or a more in-depth problem-solving capacity. Nevertheless, a re-examination of the controversy under constructivist terms argued that closure was achieved by a change in the style of thought. This analysis prompted some authors to react calling to a ‘defence of rationalism’ and insisting on explaining that the continental-drift theory was only accepted because of epistemic reasons. As the debate impacts on the way to explain scientific controversies, in this article I analyze rationalist and constructivist approaches with respect to ways to explain the social acceptance or rejection of a theory. The analytical perspectives will be contextualized within a broader theoretical discussion in philosophy and social sciences about the role of different factors that condition knowledge, which will also include an empirical approximation in the analysis of GMO and continental-drift controversies. Ultimately, the debate with rationalism is situated in a broader context about the ways of explaining the social acceptance of a theory, arguing that the problem with the rationalism that confuses a purely logical explanation with a sociological one is that it tends to judge rather than understand.

本文讨论理论选择背后的解释，即最终导致人们接受某种主张有效的原因。最近有一场关于大陆漂移讨论如何结束的争论。这场争论在理性主义术语下找到了通常的解释：韦格纳 1912 年的大陆漂移理论在 50 年后才被接受，直到板块构造理论提供了更多的证据或更深入的解决问题的能力。然而，根据建构主义术语重新审视这场争论，认为解决问题是通过思维方式的改变来实现的。这一分析促使一些作者做出反应，呼吁“捍卫理性主义”，并坚持解释大陆漂移理论只是因为认识上的原因才被接受。由于辩论影响了解释科学争议的方式，因此在本文中，我分析了理性主义和建构主义的方法来解释社会对理论的接受或拒绝。分析视角将置于哲学和社会科学中关于影响知识的不同因素的作用的更广泛的理论讨论中，其中还将包括转基因生物和大陆漂移争议分析中的经验近似。最终，与理性主义的争论是在一个更广泛的背景下进行的，即如何解释一种理论的社会接受程度，认为理性主义将纯粹逻辑解释与社会学解释混淆的问题在于它倾向于判断而不是理解。