Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts.

中文翻译：

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指称问题与第一人称思维的反身性

传统认为​​第一人称思维在某种程度上是特别的。人们普遍认为，第一人称概念遵循参照规则，即任何象征性的第一人称思想都是关于该思想的思想者的。继 Annalisa Coliva 和最近的 Santiago Echeverri 之后，我将特殊性声明认为是第一人称思维的思考伴随着其参照模式的某种保证。Echeverri 坚持认为，这种保证可以通过对思考者反思规则的相当措手不及的解释来解释。然而，我认为，只有当我们接受对以规则为特征的思想的思想家概念的认识论上的解释时，思想家反思规则的解释愿望才能实现。