What explains the truth of a universal generalization? Two types of explanation can be distinguished. While an ‘instance-based explanation’ proceeds via some or all instances of the generalization, a ‘generic explanation’ is independent of the instances, relying instead on completely general facts about the properties or operations involved in the generalization. This intuitive distinction is analyzed by means of a truthmaker semantics, which also sheds light on the correct logic of quantification. On the most natural version of the semantics, this analysis vindicates some claims made—without a proper defense—by Michael Dummett, Solomon Feferman, and others. Where instance-based explanations are freely available, classical logic is shown to be warranted. By contrast, intuitionistic logic (or slightly more) remains warranted regardless of what explanations are available.

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一般性解释

什么解释了普遍概括的真相？可以区分两种解释。虽然“基于实例的解释”通过一些或所有概括的实例进行，但“一般解释”独立于实例，而是依赖于关于概括中涉及的属性或操作的完全一般事实。这种直观的区别是通过真理制造者语义来分析的，这也揭示了量化的正确逻辑。在最自然的语义版本上，这种分析证明了迈克尔·达米特、所罗门·费弗曼和其他人在没有适当辩护的情况下提出的一些主张。在可以免费获得基于实例的解释的情况下，经典逻辑被证明是有保证的。相比之下，