We test the hypothesis that aid recipient governments are better able to utilize aid flows for political favoritism during periods in which they are of geo-strategic value to major donors. We examine the effect of a country’s (non-permanent) membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the subnational distribution of World Bank aid. Specifically, we analyze whether World Bank projects are targeted to subnational regions in which the head of state was born, or to regions dominated by the same ethnic group as that of the head of state. We find that all regions within a recipient country, on average, receive a greater number of aid projects during UNSC membership years. Moreover, a leader’s co-ethnic regions (but not birth regions) receive significantly more World Bank projects and loan commitments during UNSC membership years compared to other years. This effect is driven chiefly by interest-bearing loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Most importantly, we find stronger subnational political bias in aid allocation for aid recipients whose UNSC votes are fully aligned with those of the United States, indicating that exchanges of aid for favors occur in multilateral settings.

我们检验了这样一个假设，即受援国政府在对主要捐助者具有地缘战略价值的时期内，能够更好地利用援助流进行政治偏袒。我们研究了一个国家在联合国安理会（UNSC）中的（非常任）成员资格对世界银行援助的地方性分配的影响。具体来说，我们分析了世界银行的项目是针对国家元首出生的次国家地区，还是针对与国家元首同族的地区。我们发现，平均而言，受援国的所有地区在联合国安理会成员期间接受的援助项目数量更多。而且，与其他年份相比，领导者的同族地区（但不是出生地区）在联合国安理会成员期间获得的世界银行项目和贷款承诺要多得多。这种影响主要是由国际复兴开发银行（IBRD）的有息贷款推动的。最重要的是，我们发现联合国安理会投票与美国投票完全一致的受援国在援助分配方面存在更强的地方政治偏见，这表明以援助换人情发生在多边环境中。