A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively. (JEL D42, D82, D83, L81, M31)

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出售消费者数据以获取利润：最佳市场细分设计及其后果

数据经纪人将市场细分出售给具有私人成本的生产者，后者将产品出售给单位质量的消费者。本文描述了数据代理的收入最大化机制。每一个最优机制都会引发准完美的价格歧视。所有价值高于与成本相关的临界值的消费者通过支付他们的价值购买，而其余消费者不购买。该特征意味着即使数据经纪人变得更强大，市场结果仍然保持不变——无论是通过获得向消费者销售访问权的能力，还是通过成为购买产品并专门向消费者销售的零售商。(JEL D42、D82、D83、L81、M31)