This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent’s monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope’s (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory. (JEL D82, D86, D91)

中文翻译：

---

A/B 合同

本文旨在提高道德风险下激励合同经典理论的实际适用性。我们建立了条件，在这些条件下，激励合同的 A/B 测试提供的信息足以回答如何最好地改进现状激励合同的问题，给定代理人的货币偏好的先验知识。我们使用来自 DellaVigna 和 Pope (2018) 对各种激励合同的研究的数据来评估该结果的经验相关性。最后，我们讨论了如何扩展我们的框架，以纳入经典理论之外的其他考虑因素。(JEL D82, D86, D91)