Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something.

中文翻译：

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不知何故没有（可能）成为某物

偶然论者——他们认为存在的东西是偶然的——在拥有财产或处于关系中需要成为某种东西的主张上存在分歧。这一主张可以表述为高阶模态逻辑的自然示意图原理。在这个表述上，我认为同时也是高阶偶然论者的偶然论者——因此认为存在的命题、属性和关系是偶然的——应该拒绝这一主张。此外，我认为，给定更高阶的偶然性，拥有财产或处于关系中甚至不需要可能是某物。