A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude.

越来越多有影响力的学者已经将同理心定义为仅限于感觉相同的限制性定义一个人感知到另一个人的情绪就是感觉。我们认为，这种限制性同构匹配 (RIM) 定义存在严重问题，因为 (1) 它与传统的移情概念有很大不同，并且使这一概念脱离了几代科学研究和临床实践；(2) 坚持同构形式从多个分析角度削弱了移情的功能价值；(3) 结合同构匹配和自我-他者意识的对立概念隐含地需要动机内容，导致 RIM 定义隐含地要求它明确寻求排除的那种不匹配的情感内容。