Performative utterances such as ‘I promise you to φ’, issued under suitable conditions, have been claimed by Austin (1962) to constitute the enactment of something rather than the stating of something. They are thus not to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity. Subsequent theorists have typically contested half of this Austinian view, agreeing that a performative utterance such as ‘I promise you to φ’ is the enactment of a promise, but claiming that it is also a statement to the effect that the promise is issued. I argue that speech-act-theoretically, uttering ‘I promise you to φ’ under suitable conditions is not also the statement that the promise is issued. This is compatible, however, with the fact that semantically, ‘I promise you to φ’ is true just in case my promise to you to φ is issued.

中文翻译：

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关于表演词也是陈述

Austin (1962) 声称，在适当条件下发出的诸如“我向你保证 φ”之类的表演性话语构成了某事的制定，而不是某事的陈述。因此，不能根据真假来评估它们。随后的理论家通常对这种奥斯汀观点的一半提出质疑，同意诸如“我向你保证 φ”之类的表演性话语是对承诺的制定，但声称它也是对承诺已发出的声明。我认为，从理论上讲，在适当的条件下说出“我向你保证 φ”并不是承诺已发出的声明。然而，这与在语义上“我向你保证 φ”为真的事实是相容的，以防万一我向你发出对 φ 的承诺。