The centralization of conflict resolution and the administration of justice, two crucial elements of state formation, are often ignored by the state-building literature. This article studies the monopolization of justice administration, using the historical example of the General Indian Court (gic) of colonial Mexico. The author argues that this court’s development and decision-making process can show us how the rule of law develops in highly authoritarian contexts. Centralized courts could be used strategically to solve an agency problem, limiting local elites’ power and monitoring state agents. To curb these actors’ power, the Spanish Crown allowed the indigenous population to raise claims and access property rights. But this access remained limited and subject to the Crown’s strategic considerations. The author’s theory predicts that a favorable ruling for the indigenous population was more likely in cases that threatened to increase local elites’ power. This article shows the conditions under which the rule of law can emerge in a context where a powerful ruler is interested in imposing limits on local powers—and on their potential predation of the general population. It also highlights the endogenous factors behind the creation of colonial institutions and the importance of judicial systems in colonial governance.

中文翻译：

---

作为制衡的正义

冲突解决的集中化和司法管理这两个国家形成的关键要素，常常被国家建设文献所忽视。本文以印度普通法院（General Indian Court）的历史为例，研究司法行政的垄断。逻辑) 殖民地墨西哥。作者认为，该法院的发展和决策过程可以向我们展示法治在高度专制的背景下是如何发展的。中央法院可以战略性地用于解决代理问题，限制地方精英的权力并监督国家代理人。为了遏制这些行为者的权力，西班牙王室允许土著居民提出要求并获得财产权。但这种访问仍然受到限制，并受制于王室的战略考虑。作者的理论预测，在威胁增加当地精英权力的情况下，更有可能做出有利于土著居民的裁决。本文展示了在一个强大的统治者有兴趣限制地方权力及其对普通民众的潜在掠夺的背景下，法治可以出现的条件。它还强调了建立殖民机构背后的内生因素以及司法制度在殖民治理中的重要性。