This paper examines the relationship between school provision and the political power of the president in Uruguay between 1914 and 1954. The empirical analysis relies on fixed effects panel estimations based on newly compiled information about the partisan orientation of legislative members, electoral competition and schooling diffusion at the department-level. Ceteris paribus, I find an association between school provision and the need of government to capture votes or to obtain further legislative support. The resource allocation initially benefitted government’s core voter departments and shifted to favor non-loyal districts as an answer to the increasing intra-party political conflicts. Against the traditional historical narrative, the results point out to an influence of political interests on the diffusion of mass schooling and suggest the use of school provision as a pork barrel good over the period.

本文研究了1914年至1954年间学校供给与乌拉圭总统的政治权力之间的关系。实证分析依赖于固定影响小组的估计，该估计是基于有关立法委员的党派倾向，选举竞争和学校教育扩散的最新汇编信息而得出的。部门级。Ceteris paribus，我发现学校提供与政府需要获得选票或获得进一步的立法支持之间存在关联。资源分配最初使政府的核心选民部门受益，并转向偏爱非忠诚地区，以解决党内政治冲突日益加剧的问题。与传统的历史叙述相反，研究结果指出了政治利益对大众学校教育传播的影响，并建议在此期间将学校设施用作猪肉桶商品。