In the paraconsistent tradition, it is fairly well‐known how difficult it is to advance a theory containing a naive truth predicate together with a (classical, consistent) consistency operator. Recently, a number of theorists have risen up to the challenge by attempting to articulate such a theory. These theorists either tinker with the idea of semantic naivety, thereby imposing restrictions on the principles governing the truth predicate, or they substantially weaken the underlying syntax theory. My aim in this paper is to offer arguments against these two proposals.

中文翻译：

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始终如一地表达一致性

在超一致的传统中，众所周知的是，将包含一个幼稚的真谓词和一个（经典的，一致的）一致性算符的理论进行推广是多么困难。最近，许多理论家试图通过阐明这种理论来迎接挑战。这些理论家要么修补语义幼稚的概念，从而对管理真谓语的原则施加限制，要么实质上削弱了底层语法理论。我在本文中的目的是提出反对这两个建议的论点。