Evaluativism by Carruthers and reflexive imperativism by Barlassina and Hayward agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its worldly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers's own standards. He maintains that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in imagination‐based decision‐making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill.

中文翻译：

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超越好与坏：反身的失落主义，而不是评价主义，解释了价

Carruthers的评价主义和Barlassina和Hayward的反思性不赞成主义同意，价（一种（不）令人愉悦的体验）是所有情感状态之间的一种自然现象。但是他们不同意价数。对于评价论来说，一种体验是愉悦的/令人不愉快的，因为它代表着世俗的对象是好是坏。对于反身主义的主义，一种经验是令人愉悦的/令人不愉快的，因为它命令其主体获得更多/更少的自我。我认为，按照卡鲁瑟斯自己的标准，反身无礼主义比评估主义优越。他认为，效价理论应解释其现象学和其在基于想象力的决策中的作用。我表明，符合这种解释性要求的是反思性的不主流主义而不是评价性的。