According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental properties, as opposed to non‐mental properties.

中文翻译：

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经验证据是否支持感知思维？

根据对读心术的知觉解释，我们可以看到而不是认知他人的心理状态。在这种方法的一个版本中，某些心理特性体现在我们的感性体验的内容中。瓦尔加（Varga）在最近的一篇论文中呼吁进行实证研究，认为意图和情感的确可以看到，而不是被认知。在本文中，我认为，没有证据支持对阅读的知觉解释表明我们看到了心理特性，而不是非心理特性。