Abstract In this paper, I attempt to argue alongside Clayton Crockett that Timothy Morton’s hyperobjects can be extended to encompass every object, not merely those that are large in comparison to human beings. However, unlike Crockett who uses the works of Derrida and Lacan to achieve this goal, I turn to Husserl’s underdeveloped theory of hyletic phenomenology and hyle. Despite Husserl’s articulation of hyletic phenomenology ending as quickly as it is announced, I argue that three lessons can be learned from what Husserl does have to say about hyle. Specifically, hyle is non-intentional, it is co-constitutive of intentionality, and hyle contains the possibility of broadening our traditional understanding of objects. Taken together, I suggest that Husserl’s understanding of hyle caries considerable overlap with both Crockett and Morton’s understanding of hyperobjects.

中文翻译：

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系统现象学与超对象

摘要在本文中，我试图与克莱顿·克罗克特（Clayton Crockett）一起争论蒂莫西·莫顿（Timothy Morton）的超对象可以扩展为包含每个对象，而不仅仅是与人类相比大的对象。但是，与克罗基特使用德里达和拉康的作品来实现这一目标不同，我转向胡塞尔的不成熟的现象学现象学和油le论。尽管胡塞尔对言语现象学的表述很快就结束了，但我认为，从胡塞尔关于海尔的论述中可以学到三个教训。具体来说，hyle是非故意的，它是意图的共同构成，而hyle包含了扩展我们对对象的传统理解的可能性。在一起